

*The International Training course on  
“Development of Plan for Business Continuity Management for Ports”*

# **Business Continuity Management for ports in Japan**

*-Recent policy development and challenges-*

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# Topics

1. Background and Challenges
2. Starting line of preparing business continuity plans (BCPs) at ports.
3. New horizon of BCM challenges
  - a. Storm surge
  - b. Na-tech disaster
  - c. Security for port automation/digitalization
5. Conclusions and further challenges

# Background and Challenges

1. Great East Japan Earthquake caused long continued port shutdown, which caused delay in recovery of local economy and long continued declining or collapse of the local community.
2. The government policy **under the Basic Law for Increasing National Resiliency** in 2014 facilitated to prepare business continuity plan for port operation and management (port-BCP) at all Japanese major ports.
3. Storm surge disasters in 2018 and 2019 reminded Japanese port community of the importance of reinforcing port BCPs by considering a mega-typhoon and tropical depression.
4. Large-scale industrial accidents and cyber-attack at port are also considered newly arising port logistics disruption risks .

# Our experiences of Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami



# Scope of business continuity at ports

For maintaining port competitiveness and sustainable development, it is vital to manage continuity of:

- I. public and private port logistics services,
- II. administration functions of the authorities, and
- III. area-wide and community-based emergency responding capacity.

Preparing BCP is a basic requirement requested for the port community to prepare, implement and continuously improve. BCP is an essential proactive measure for all private and public entities to sufficiently cope with a wide range of possible emergency situations and a best practice of managing local, regional and national economy through sound port operation and management.

# Major requirements of BCP preparation

## 1. Reality and rationality

- Market/client oriented strategic thinking, and
- Workable risk management, = **availability of operation resources.**  
for the business continuity.

⇒ Missions of **BIA and RA exercises.**

## 2. Broad-based participation

- Cross-sectorial inclusion, and
- Strong commitment of the top management.  
for seeking broad based input from top management decision to the on-site expertize, knowledge and experiences.


## 3. Systematized process with transparency

- Describing a business process: **Business flow analysis (BFA)**
- Visualizing analyzing and evaluating procedures: **Work-sheet system.**

# BCP preparation situations in Japan


Companies with BCP

Nos of responses



Data : Questionnaire survey undertaken by the Cabinet Office, Japanese government, March, 2018


# BCP preparation situations of large companies in Japan



Data : Questionnaire survey undertaken by the Cabinet Office, Japanese government, March, 2018




# BCP preparation situations of medium size companies in Japan



- Active
- In preparation
- Under consideration
- Unprepared
- No appreciation
- The rest


Data : Questionnaire survey undertaken by the Cabinet Office, Japanese government, March 2018

# What are focused on the BCPs in Japan





Data : Questionnaire survey undertaken by the Cabinet Office, Japanese government, March 2018

# Context of the risk management at port



# Storm surge, wind wave and gust (Typhoon Jebi)

1. Formed: August 26, 2018
2. Highest winds:
  - 10-minute sustained: 54.2 m/sec.
  - 1-minute sustained: 79.2 m/sec
3. Lowest pressure: 915 hPa (mbar)



Jebi crossed Osaka Bay and made its second landfall over Kobe, Hyōgo Prefecture at around 14:00, on September 4. In the center of Osaka, the exceptional maximum gust of 47.4 m/sec was recorded. Jebi produced a maximum storm surge of 3.29 m in Osaka, surpassing the previous record of 2.93 m from the 2nd Muroto Typhoon (Typhoon Nancy) in 1961.

# Damages caused by Typhoon Jebi

## 1. Gust / strong wind :

- a. **Damage of STS crane due to flying debris**: Crane cub window, sidewall, door, rudder, handrail damaged => operation suspended for repair works.
- b. **Collapse of stacked empty container**: Damages of security fence, monitoring camera, infrared ray sensor, panel lights => failure of fulfilling SOLAS Convention requirements.
- c. **Runaway of under repair RTG**: collateral damage to another transfer crane.

## 2. Storm surge and wind wave:

- a. **Drifted containers**: Closure of port water => ship call suspended.
- b. **Container fire**: fire spread, fire fighting operation => Closure of stacking yard, decrease in container stacking capacity.
- c. **Inundated extra high-voltage substation**: de-energization => terminal black out => loss of reefer cargo, terminal operation suspension.

# Crane damage caused by the gust



Damaged insulation coating




Interlocked cables



Runaway and collapse of RTGs



Falling off of Gantry crane cable guide



Collapsed boarding bridge

# Container fire due to the inundation



# Energy industries in Tokyo bay area

The number of oil tanks:  
5,660 (in Tokyo bay area)  
(Heavy oil, naphtha etc)

⇒Risks of oil spill and fire  
disaster in Tokyo Bay.

The number of thermal power  
plants: 12  
(Heavy oil, Liquefied natural  
gas)

⇒Risks of blackout in Tokyo  
metropolitan area.






# Risk of collapsing oil tanks

Liquefaction phenomenon of oil tank foundation.

- ✓ Petro-chemical complex built on the reclaimed land of Tokyo bay.
- ✓ Liquefaction of the ground caused by Long-period seismic movement.



# Risk of oil spill and fire from oil tanks

Sloshing phenomenon of crude/heavy oil tanks.

- ✓ 1/3 of oil tanks in Tokyo bay: floating roof tank.
- ✓ Damage of tank roof, overflow of liquid and fire caused by Long-period seismic movement .




Photo: National Maritime Research Institute



  
KAJIMA CORPORATION

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# Na –Tech Disaster in ports

“Na-Tech Disaster” is defined as a natural hazard triggered technological disaster. Recent examples in Japan include Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Station accident and an Oil refinery fire accident in Chiba, both caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake.

Japan Coast Guard, Maritime Disaster Prevention Center and Tokyo Fire Department undertook cease fire operations by from sea (Cooling down operation), which was completed March 13, 2011, however final cease fire was the March 21.



Also fighting!

# Na –Tech disaster in Tianjin, China



# New technologies for port operation and management

## *Digitalization of port operations*

**Targets: modernization of port operation and management by mobilizing cutting-edge ICT such as artificial intelligence (AI)**

### **Basic Ideas:**

- => **Digital data collection** from daily business transaction/port procedures and sensors embedded in terminal facilities.
- => Big data creation by **mobilizing IoT** = Automated data transmission
- => **AI assisting** in terminal operation and management.

### **Recent topics:**


- a. **Online cargo information platform** : **TradeLens** (Maersk Line & IBM), Port Optimizer (LA Port), Calista (PSA) etc.
- b. **ICT based port operation and management**: Smart-port logistics (Hamburg port), **AI terminal initiatives** (Japan) etc.

# “TradeLens” developed by Maersk & IBM

**TradeLens:** A global trade platform using blockchain technology. TradeLens aims at improving transportation cost, lack of visibility and inefficiencies with paper-based processes.

## Strength of TradeLens


- Neutral and open platform – connect existing systems of supply chain members
- Unpinned by blockchain technology – support secure, auditable and non-repudiable transactions
- Real time visibility – integrate member’s system via API that enables seamless, real-time information sharing
- Innovation – deploy services through application marketplace



# ICT driven facility management

Big data creations have started in a variety of areas, among which data obtained from STS crane operations is expected to be de-sterilized for facility management of cranes such as the preventive machine maintenance.

## Challenge of HPC



# Port operation automation

## Container Terminal Automations:

- a. Port **development settings**: “Blue”, “Green” and “Brown” fields.
- b. Terminal **automation levels**: semi-automated and fully automated.
- c. Key element **integration**: STS crane, horizontal transporter and stacking crane. Synchronizing the machine movements is essential for efficient and safer cargo circulation, thus **data collection and control system** is vital.
- d. Existing terminal **conversion**: **Retrofitting of RTGs, introducing AutoStrad** etc.  
=> Shorter terminal close, minimizing disruption of operational revenues, partial commissioning, incremental technology implementation.
- e. Current automation challenges: more than 65 terminals incl. ongoing projects, mostly semi-automated. Has Qingdao port been fully automated?



# An example of semi-automated terminal.

- a. Tobishima Terminal of Nagoya Port in Japan.
- b. Terminal operation inaugurated in 2006.
- c. Sea side transportation: Automated guided vehicle (AGV).
- d. Stacking yard operation: Semi-automated RTG (Rubber Tired Gantry Crane).





Fig: Mitsui E&S Machinery



Fig&Photo: Toyota industries Co

## Conclusions and further challenges

1. As requested by *ISO22301*, proper **implementation of BIA and RA** is essential for preparing an effective BCPs, thus should be employed in the area of port operation and management.
2. **Typhoon** originated storm surge, wind wave and strong wind risks are now non-negligible events, which may cause manor disruption of port logistics function.
3. **Na-Tec disaster** at port such as flammable or hazardous material stockpile explosion and fire accidents may result in a large-scale disaster, to which it is likely impossible for a single business entity and authority properly to respond.
4. **Digitalization and automation** at ports are indispensable and inevitable, however negative impact of the IT system disruption or cyber attack on the port logistics is of great significance.
5. Port BCP must include proactive measures and emergency response plan for the typhoon disaster, Na-Tec disaster and ICT system disruption.